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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: IS THERE A PROTECTED INTEREST
IN PROTECTION (OR ARE COURT ORDERS MERELY
SUGGESTIONS)?
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005)
Robert Michael Kline*

Respondent's husband abducted his three little girls, ages 10, 8, and 7,
and shot each of them in the head at close range. 1 He committed this
abhorrent and tragic triple murder despite the fact that Respondent had
obtained a restraining order commanding him to stay away from the girls.2
Accordingly, Respondent claimed the town of Castle Rock, Colorado
violated the Due Process Clause 3 and brought an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,' alleging that the town's police department tolerated the nonenforcement of restraining orders and that such actions were either willful,
reckless, or grossly negligent.5 The district court granted the town's

* To my wife, Olguita, whose inexhaustible love and patience provide constant inspiration.
1. For an article describing the tragedy see Gonzalez v. Castle Rock, Mar. 20, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/17/60minutes/main681416.shtml.
2. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796,2801-02 (2005). Respondent obtained
a restraining order from a state trial court in conjunction with her divorce proceedings. Id.
Respondent's husband subsequently abducted Respondent's three daughters from outside the family
home. Id. After Respondent realized that the children were gone, she called the police several times
throughout the night in a futile effort to have the restraining order enforced. Id. At 3:20 a.m.,
Respondent's husband arrived at the police station and opened fire; officers returned fire, killing
him instantly. Id. Police soon discovered that he had murdered all three daughters and left them in
the cab of his pickup truck. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
5. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.
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motion to dismiss. 6 The court of appeals, however, reversed, holding that
Respondent had a legitimate procedural due process claim. On rehearing
en banc, a divided court reached the same conclusion, 8 but the United
States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, that Respondent did not, under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,9 have a
property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her
1l
husband.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides, in part,
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."" The Supreme Court's interpretation of the clause
prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of life, liberty
or property without first giving that person notice and an opportunity to be
heard.' Consequently, the first element of a procedural due process claim
that alleges a deprivation of property is the identification of a property
interest. 3 In cases involving tangible property, a property interest is
usually easy to ascertain.' 4 When the property interest is not readily
identifiable, however, procedural due process cases become more
complicated. 5 As a result, there has been much discussion about what
6
should constitute a property interest requiring procedural due process.'
In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 7 the Supreme Court

6. Id.
7. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002).
8. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1095 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). In
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Departmentof Social Services,489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Supreme
Court determined that the Constitution does not require a state to protect its citizens from a third
party. See Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1099. Subsequently, respondent did not have a valid substantive
due process claim. id. Nevertheless, DeSahaney left open the possibility of a claim based on
procedural due process. See id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2810.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863) (holding that "[c]ommon justice
requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an
opportunity to make his defence").
13. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886,895-96 (1961)); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,482-83 (1972) (establishing that
when the Due Process Clause is invoked in a novel context, the Court can properly evaluate the
adequacy of the State's process only after the precise nature of the interest has been identified).
14. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (challenging a replevin procedure that
allowed a third party to seize items that the appellant had purchased on credit).
15. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,255 (1970) (analyzing whether there was a property
interest in a citizen's statutory entitlement to welfare benefits).
16. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrONAL LAW 534-38 (2002) (describing the
evolution of the Supreme Court's interpretation of what constitutes a property interest as
contemplated by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution).
17. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/7
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examined the notion of intangible property interests.' 8 In Roth, the
respondent was hired as an assistant professor for a fixed term of one
year.19 When he was not rehired the following year, he brought an action
alleging that the decision violated his procedural due process rights.2 0 The
district court granted summaryjudgment for the respondent 2 l and the court
of appeals affirmed.2 2 The United State Supreme Court, however,
reversed.23
In coming to its decision, the Court stated that "the range of interests
protected by procedural due process is not infinite."'24 The Court then
defined property interests by noting that "[t]o have a property interest in
a benefit, a person clearly must... have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it."'25 The Supreme Court went on to point out that property interests are
not created by the Constitution.26 Instead, they are created and "defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state-law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits. '27 Thus, even though the
respondent had an "abstract concern" in being rehired, he did not have a
property interest in continued employment at the university, absent
specific contractual terms providing a right to re-employment for the next
year.28 Although the Court did not find that respondent had a property
interest,29 Roth did serve to establish the benchmark that future courts
would look to in determining whether an individual had a protected
interest for procedural due process purposes.30
18. See id. at 577 (describing characteristics of an intangible property interest).
19. Id. at 566.
20. Id. at 568-69. The president of the university did not give respondent any reason for the
decision, nor an opportunity to challenge the decision. Id. at 568. The terms of respondent's one
year contract did not require the president to use any procedure in making his decision. Id.
21. Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972,983 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th
Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
22. Roth v. Bd.of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that the substantial adverse
effect of nonretention on career interests of professor warranted letting him explore reasons for
nonretention and that a minimal opportunity to test them in a hearing was an appropriate protection
of a due process right), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
23. Roth, 408 U.S. at 579.
24. Id. at 570.
25. Id. at 577.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. ld. at 578.
29. Id. at 579.
30. See id. at 577-78 (establishing the legitimate claim of entitlement standard).
Subsequently, the Court acknowledged a number of entitlement property interests protected by the
Due Process Clause including continued public employment, Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593,
602-03 (1972); a free education, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); and the receipt of
government utility services, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
Published
by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Roth, therefore, defines property as an "entitlement."' 3 1 The ipiherent
difficulty in the definition rests in the fact that the quoted language from
Roth lends itself to two conflicting approaches. 32 On the one hand, an
entitlement could be defined by the importance the individual places on
the interest; that is, if an individual relies on a government benefit in her
daily life, then it should be deemed a property interest that cannot be
arbitrarily undermined.33 The Roth Court, however, also concludedthat an
entitlement is determined by an "independent source such as state law"
and the "rules or understandings" that it creates. 34 Accordingly, this view
suggests that an entitlement only exists if there is a "reasonable
' 35 The Supreme Court has
expectation to continued receipt of a benefit.
36
approach.
second
generally followed this
In O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center,37 the Supreme Courtfurther narrowed the definition of property interest by restricting the
approach elucidated in Roth.38 In O'Bannon, patients at a nursing home
claimed they had a right to a hearing before a state or federal agency could
revoke the home's authority to provide them with care paid for. by the
government.39 In response to the patients' claim, the O'Bannon Court
acknowledged that the government cannot withdraw direct benefits from
an individual without due process, but also determined that residents of the.
nursing home were only indirectly and incidentally
affected by
°
party.'
third
a
towards
aimed
action
government
The O'Bannon Court further explained that even though government
action may have an adverse impact on certain individuals, if that impact
is incidental and indirect, it cannot amount to a deprivation of any property
interest.4" Analyzing the case using the Roth standard, the O 'Bannon Court
found that such an indirect result could not constitute a legitimate claim of
entitlement. 42 Thus, the direct/indirect impact test refined the definition of
protected entitlement interest first set forth in Roth.

31. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 537 (discussing the
ramifications of Roth's entitlement view to property).
32. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 537 (same).

33. Id.
34. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
35. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 537.

36. Id. at 537-38.
37. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
38. Id. at 787-88.
39. Id. at 775. In O'Bannon,residents of a retirement home brought a procedural due process
claim suggesting that they had been deprived of a property interest when the home was decertified,
resulting in the loss of its government funding. Id. at 777.
40. Id. at 786-87.
41.

Id. at 787.

42. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/7
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Three years after O'Bannon,the Supreme Court added another element
that must be satisfied before an entitlement interest may be recognized.43
In Olim v. Wakinekona," the Supreme Court decided whether the transfer
of an inmate from a Hawaii state prison to a California state prison
implicates a protected interest within the meaning of the Due Process
.Clause,45 The Court held that even though a state creates a protected
interest by putting substantive limits on official discretion, Hawaii's prison
regulations did not place any substantive limitations on the prison
administrator's discretion to transfer a prisoner.' That is, if the
decisionmaker can deny the requested relief for any constitutionally
permissible reason, as opposed to being required to base his decision on
.'objective and defined criteria," then the state has not created a protected
entitlement requiring due process. 47 As a result, a benefit is not a protected
entitlement if government officials may deny it at their discretion.48
In failing to find a protected interest in the enforcement of the
restraining order, the instant Court adopted the Olim rationale by
emphasizing the fact that police officers could use discretion in
determining how to enforce the restraining order.49 Specifically, the Court
.observed that police officers could enforce the order either by arresting the
husband, or by seeking an arrest warrant; thus, the instant Court asserted
that enforcement could be accomplished in a variety of ways.5 ° According
to the Court, if the means of enforcement were indeterminate, the police
officer's duty was discretionary and could not be considered mandatory.51

43. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (inquiring into the substantive
limitations placed on official discretion).
44. 'Id. at 238.
45.. Id. at 240. Respondent was serving a life sentence for a murder conviction in a maximum
security state prison in Hawaii. Id. There, he was identified as a security risk and deemed a
disruptive inmate because he prevented the prison from effectively conducting certain programs.
Id. at 241. As a result, he was transferred to Folsom State Prison in California. Id.
46. Id. at 249.
47. Id.; see also Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989) (holding that
regulations containing explicitly mandatory language create a protected interest).
48. See, e.g., Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987) (holding that mandatory
language in a regulation, in conjunction with specific criteria that have been met in order to deny
a benefit, creates a presumption of entitlement); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)
(holding "the repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific
substantfv'e predicates demands a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest").
49. -SeeTown of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796,2803-08 (2005) (determining the
degree of police discretion tolerated under Colorado law). Even though Olim, Allen, and Hewitt
addressed liberty interests in a prison setting, the methodology used in those cases has also been
"employed in claims of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause." Gonzales, 366
F.3d at li02 n.6 (quoting Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
50., Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. at 2807-08.
51. Id.
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The instant Court's determination that enforcement of the restraining
order was discretionary also came from the order's directive to law
enforcement personnel. 2 In light of the restraining order's language, the
Court did not believe that the provisions of the Colorado law made
enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.53 Even though the Colorado
statute used the words "shall arrest" and "shall enforce," the Court
nevertheless determined that, in light of other "seemingly mandatory
legislative commands" that had not been construed literally, the statute
afforded the police discretion in deciding whether to enforce the
restraining order. 4 The Court thus decided that in order to make
legislature would have needed
enforcement mandatory the Colorado
5
statute.
the
in
language
stronger
The instant Court also looked to O'Bannon to support its finding that
Respondent did not have a cognizable property interest in the enforcement
of her restraining order.5 6 The instant Court suggested that the benefit
Respondent would have received from police enforcement of the
restraining order was only incidental or indirect.57 In explaining this point,
52. Id. at 2804-05. The language on the restraining order effectively restated the language
contained in Colorado's applicable restraining statute, which provides:
(a) Whenever a protection order is issued, the protected person shall be provided
with a copy of such order. A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to
enforce a protection order. (b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would
be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a
restrained person when the peace officer has information amounting to probable
cause that: (I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any
provision of a protection order; and (II) The restrained person has been properly
served with a copy of the protection order or the restrained person has received
actual notice of the existence and substance of such order. (c) In making the
probable cause determination described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), a
peace officer shall assume that the information received from the registry is
accurate. A peace officer shall enforce a valid protection order whether or not
there is a record of the protection order in the registry.
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(30) (2005).
53. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2806.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Court pointed out that other statutes incorporating the word "shall" were clearly
meant to afford the police discretion. Id. As an example, the Court pointed out a Colorado statute
that tells municipal police chiefs that they "'shall pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice
in any part of the state' and that they "'shall apprehend any person in the act of committing any
offense.. . and, forthwith and without any warrant, bring such person before a... competent
authority for examination and trial."' Id. (citing CoLO. REV. STAT. § 31-4-112 (2004)). The Court
stated it is "common sense that all police officers must use some discretion in deciding when and
where to enforce city ordinances." Id. (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62 n.32 (1999)).
56. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2810.
57. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/7
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the Court stated that Respondent's alleged property interest did not arise
out of "some new species of government service."58 Rather, the alleged
property interest arose out of arresting people who police have probable
cause to believe have committed a criminal offense; this, the Court
asserted, is a discretionary function that government actors have always
carried out.59
Furthermore, the Court indicated that if the legislature had intended to
give the Respondent the sort of statutory entitlement envisioned in Roth,
then the statute would have explicitly reflected it. 60 The statute gave the
Respondent the power to initiate contempt proceedings if the order was
issued in a civil action, and request initiation of contempt proceedings if
the order was issued in a criminal action. However, the statute made no
mention of the Respondent's ability to request, or more importantly, to
demand, that an arrest be made. 6' The lack of explicit authorization giving
the Respondent the ability to force the police's hand was instrumental in
the Court's decision. 62
The instant Court, however, failed to explain why the state statute must
explicitly authorize the respondent to initiate enforcement in order to
establish a protected property interest.63 While Roth does require that a
claimant have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" before a protected
interest can be established,' this standard appears to afford the Court
significant latitude in recognizing property interests.65 In the instant case,
the Court did not show that legitimate claims of entitlement have only
come from statutes that explicitly provide the individual with an
entitlement.' In fact, the Court quoted the language in Roth asserting that
property interests are "defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law." 67
In the instant case, the independent source of state law is the Colorado

58. Id. at 2809.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2808. The Court suggests that even though the statute does reference "protected
person[s]" several times, the statute makes these references in connection with matters other than
enforcement. Id.
61. Id. at 2809.
62. See id. (rationalizing that Respondent's interest stemmed from a statute which was silent
about any power to demand an arrest).
63. See id. (asserting merely that the creation of an entitlement cannot "simply g[o] without
saying").
64. Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
65. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 536-38.
66. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2807-09 (reasoning that no explicit entitlement exists, without
explaining why such a finding is conclusive).
67. Id. at 2803.
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restraining order statute.68 Furthermore, it does not seem unreasonable to
assert that there is an understanding that protected persons are entitled to
enforcement of a restraining order that has been issued with the purpose
of protecting them.69 One might wonder what the purpose of the law is if
the protected person is not entitled to protection.70 Surely the victim of
domestic abuse who petitions a court for a restraining order does not do so
with the expectation that he or she will go unprotected.7" Taken in this
light, the restraining order must create a reasonable expectation that a
legitimate claim of entitlement to its enforcement exists.72 Furthermore, it
remains unclear why the instant Court felt Respondent must be explicitly
authorized to initiate enforcement when the statute itself compels
enforcement.73
The Court also failed to acknowledge that it is implicit in the statute
that if police seek an arrest warrant when "an arrest would be impractical
under the circumstances," 74 rather than arrest the individual who is in
violation of the order, they are still obligated to arrest the individual at the
first reasonable opportunity." More importantly, the Court did not
acknowledge that the restraining order may have called for mandatory
enforcement in the sense that the police had to do something when offered
probable cause that the restraining order had been violated.76 The language
of the statute mandated that police either arrest the husband, or seek a
warrant for his arrest; the option not to act was apparently impermissible
within the language of the statute.77
Additionally, the Court gave inadequate weight to the legislative
history of domestic violence statutes when concluding that enforcement of
68. Id. at 2804-05.
69. Id. at 2821 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2822.
73. Id. at 2821.
74. Id. at 2819 (quoting CoLO.REV. STAT. §18-6-803.5(3)(B) (1999)).
75. See id. at 2820 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute was motivated by distrust
of police discretion in the domestic violence context).
76. Id. at 2819-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Law enforcement officers might have a small
amount of discretion in how they enforce a restraining order, but this does not diminish the
underlying entitlement to enforcement. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1107 (majority opinion). States are
given tremendous discretion in how to educate their children, but the Supreme Court still
determined that the ultimate receipt of the benefit, in the form of a free education, was a protected
entitlement. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975)).
77. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. at 2819-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Joan H. Krause, Of
Merciful Justice and JustifiedMercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46
FLA. L. REV. 699, 703 (1994) (discussing the problems battered women face in the legal system).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/7
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the restraining order was discretionary.78 Despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has determined that the word "shall" is used in laws to express what
is mandatory,79 the instant Court looked to other statutes where the word
"shall" had been interpreted to afford police discretion in the enforcement
of certain laws." The legislative history of domestic violence statutes,
however, makes it clear that the statutes were created with the express
purpose of compelling police officers to enforce restraining orders.81
The instant Court could have made an effort to distinguish O 'Bannon.82
Specifically, the statute in the instant case identified Respondent and her

78. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2819 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Colorado General Assembly
passed omnibus legislation aimed at domestic violence in 1994. Id. at 2817-18. In doing so,
Colorado joined a nationwide movement of states that targeted the crisis of police
underenforcement of domestic violence. Id.; see also Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State:
The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 1657, 1662-63
(discussing police officers' tendency to assign domestic violence calls low priority or ignore them
entirely); Krause, supra note 77, at 703 (discussing the problems battered women face in the legal
system).
79. See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) (discussing the customary use of
"shall" as language used in command); see also Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 302 (1989)
(categorizing "shall" along with "must" as command expressions); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 958
(abridged 6th ed. 1991) ("As used in statutes . . . ['shall'] is generally imperative or
mandatory... The word in ordinary usage means 'must' and is inconsistent with a concept of
discretion."). Cf. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) ("When a word is not defined
by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.").
80. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (examining the tendency to tolerate discretion despite
the presence of mandatory language).
81. See generally Brief for National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04278) (reasoning that the intent of the laws is to serve as a barrier, and thus requires arrest upon
violation). Several jurisdictions around the country have held that enforcement of restraining orders
is mandatory. Id. at 10-16. The legislative history of the Colorado statute also indicates that the
enforcement of restraining orders did not leave police with discretion in their enforcement. Id. at
9-10. Furthermore, the Violence Against Women Act of 1993 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title
IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994), signaled "Congress' recognition of domestic violence as a national
problem." Id. at 17. See generally S. REP. No. 103-138 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-395 (1993); S.
REP. No. 102-197 (1991); S. R P. No. 101-545 (1990) (demonstrating Congress's concern with the
national domestic violence problem). "When considering VAWA, Congress heard ample evidence
that protective orders are rendered ineffective by non-enforcement." Brief for National Network
to End Domestic Violence, supra,at 18-19. As a result of its investigations and work on this issue,
Congress decided that any "burden" imposed on law enforcement by policies requiring enforcement
of protective orders was one worth shouldering to protect victims of domestic violence and their
children. Id. at 18. A protective order that is issued after notice and a hearing, and is consistent with
the State's policy for safeguarding against future domestic violence, thus distinctly secures a benefit
that supports a claim of entitlement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 8.
82. See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 787 (1980) (finding that the
impact was merely incidental/indirect, unlike the instant case).
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daughters as "protected persons."83 As such, the benefit to Respondent and
her daughters should be viewed as integral to both the statute and the court
order, rather than incidental or indirect. The instant Court, in relying on
O'Bannon, did not differentiate between restraining orders and criminal
laws of general applicability.' With laws of general applicability, the
community at large receives the primary benefit, whereas the individual
receives only an incidental benefit arising from enforcement of the law; in the
case of restraining orders, however, the protected person identified in the
order receives the primary benefit from its enforcement.8 5
Despite the instant Court's apparent reliance on binding precedent, it
seems as though policy considerations were the instrumental factor that led
to the instant Court's holding. Although the instant Court was presented with
a significant amount of evidence proving that the non-enforcement of
domestic restraining orders leads to more serious occurrences of domestic
violence,' the instant Court seemed more concerned with a slippery slope
argument---one that would potentially "bankrupt municipal governments for
their inevitable instances of less than perfect law enforcement."87 This latter
policy concern seems premature, as a modicum of fair process would
conceivably protect the Respondent's interest from arbitrary deprivation."
The instant Court should have used Roth, O'Bannon, and Olim as tools
to support finding a protected interest in the enforcement of Respondent's
restraining order, for any other holding renders domestic abuse restraining
orders completely worthless. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court marginalized
several of the instant facts in order to resist a holding that some predicted
would subject municipal governments to endless litigation.8 9 By further
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(1.5)(a) (2005) ("'Protected person' means the person or
persons,... for whose benefit the protection order was issued.").
84. See generally Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2796 (failing to distinguish restraining orders from
laws of general applicability).
85. Id.
86. Brief for National Network to End Domestic Violence, supra note 81, at 17.
87. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Mull Rights of Those Seeking Police Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A21.
88. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2824-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Also, in Roth v. Board of
Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting), Justice Marshall noted that:
It can scarcely be argued that government would be crippled by a requirement that
the reason [for nonenforcement] be communicated to the person most directly
affected by the government's action.... As long as the government has a good
reason for its actions it need not fear disclosure. It is only where the government
acts improperly that procedural due process is truly burdensome. And that is
precisely when it is most necessary.
Id.
89. See Breaden Marshall Douthett, The Death of ConstitutionalDuty: The Court Reacts to

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/7

10

Kline: Constitutional Law: Is There
a Protected Interest in Protection (
CASE COMMENT

469

limiting the boundaries of property interests, the Court sacrificed the very
ideal sought by those who possess restraining orders: safety from harm and
assurance of government protection. Unfortunately, this decision
demonstrated the Court's unwillingness to recognize legitimate property
interests. More importantly, it indicated the Court's preference to eviscerate
duly issued court orders, rather than afford the victims of domestic violence
even a scintilla of security.

the Expansion of Section 1983 Liabilityin DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 643, 651 (1991) (discussing the reluctance of courts to create law which
burdens the state with new tort duties).
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